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This paper discusses the ecological case for epistemic innocence: does biased cognition have
evolutionary beneﬁts, and if so, does that exculpate human reasoners from irrationality?
Proponents of ‘ecological rationality’ have challenged the bleak view of human reasoning
emerging from research on biases and fallacies. If we approach the human mind as an
adaptive toolbox, tailored to the structure of the environment, many alleged biases and fal-
lacies turn out to be artefacts of narrow norms and artiﬁcial set-ups. However, we argue
that putative demonstrations of ecological rationality involve subtle locus shifts in attribu-
tions of rationality, conﬂating the adaptive rationale of heuristics with our own epistemic
credentials. By contrast, other cases also involve an ecological reframing of human reason,
but do not involve such problematic locus shifts. We discuss the difference between these
cases, bringing clarity to the rationality debate.
 2014 Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
Like any other biological organ, the human brain is a product of evolution by natural selection: The brain secretes thought
as the liver secretes bile, wrote the 18th century French physiologist Pierre Cabanis in his Des Rapports du Physique et du Mor-
ale de l’Homme. But does the brain’s biological provenance suggest it must be successful at producing true beliefs and making
rational judgments? Several generations of psychologists have suggested otherwise, documenting the myriad ﬂaws and
foibles of human reasoning (Gilovich, Grifﬁn, & Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).
Especially in popular summaries of this research, humans come off rather badly – prone to all sorts of biases and fallacies,
woefully inadequate at dealing with probability and uncertainty, and inclined to persist in making errors of social judgment,
even after these have been clearly spelled out (Ariely, 2009; Piattelli-Palmarini, 1996; Shermer, 2011; Singer & Benassi,
1981; Sutherland, 2007). The psychologist John Kihlstrom (2004) has called this the ‘People are Stupid’ school of psychology
(PASSP).
M. Boudry et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 33 (2015) 524–535 525Recently, however, a new wave of research, inspired by evolutionary ideas, has posed a challenge to this bleak picture of
human reason. This school of thought heralds an ecological conception of rationality, aligning itself with research in evolu-
tionary psychology. If we approach the humanmind as a collection of cognitive heuristics, tailored to the structure of the eco-
logical environment, many alleged biases and fallacies arguably emerge as artefacts of narrow norms and artiﬁcial set-ups.
After introducing this ‘ecological rationality’ research program, we identify a ‘locus shift’ in some attributions of rational-
ity. In these cases, individual reasoners are being praised as rational simply because the heuristics employed in their reason-
ing show adaptive design (i.e. are ‘‘rational’’ from an evolutionary perspective). In other words, the adaptive rationale of
cognition (evolutionary locus) is conﬂated with our own epistemic credentials (personal locus). We then evaluate whether
the normative categories of (ir)rationality can still be applied at the evolutionary level of analysis, and conclude that this
facet of the ‘ecological defence’ is confusing: (a) human reasoners do not deserve the ‘‘credit’’ for the adaptive designs they
have been equipped with, and (b) evolution cannot exculpate human irrationality. Finally, we discuss cases in which the pro-
gram of ecological rationality has succeeded in rehabilitating human reason, showing that earlier charges of irrationality had
been premature. These cases also involve a form of ecological reframing, but they do not involve adaptive locus shifts.
The aim of this paper is to provide some much needed clariﬁcation to the debate about rationality. In particular, by clar-
ifying which ‘defences’ of putative irrationality are legitimate and which illegitimate, we hope to provide a robust conceptual
framework within which to situate and evaluate future empirical evidence. The debate about rationality is not merely of aca-
demic interest: irrationality is a topic of critical personal and social import. Biased beliefs about the self and the future may
promote individually harmful behaviours like smoking, unsafe sex and overspending, as well as potentially precipitating glo-
bal catastrophes such as sectarian violence, world wars, exploding ﬁnancial bubbles and environmental disasters (Johnson &
Fowler, 2011; Sharot, 2011). Given these wide-ranging outcomes, getting clear about the nature and extent of human irra-
tionality is a critical philosophical and psychological project.
2. Ecological rationality
2.1. Recasting rationality in the environment
In the heuristics and biases program instigated by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in the 80s (Kahneman, 2011;
Kahneman et al., 1982), heuristics are viewed as mental short-cuts leading to imperfect and often outright irrational infer-
ences. Though Kahneman and Tversky pointed out that even fallible heuristics often lead to successful inferences, over time
this sense of balance was lost, and a negative slant began to dominate the research program they founded (Krueger & Funder,
2004).1 The program of ecological rationality, by contrast (Fawcett et al., 2014; Gigerenzer, Hertwig, & Pachur, 2011; Gigerenzer
& Todd, 1999; Hertwig & Hoffrage, 2013; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2012), aims to effect a gestalt switch, urging us to rethink the
norms of what counts as rational.
The canons of ‘classical’ rationality, to which Kahneman & Tversky’s subjects were held accountable, consist of a general,
formal, content-free framework for valid reasoning (e.g. modus ponens). Advocates of ‘ecological rationality’, by contrast,
uphold a radically different view of heuristic reasoning. Heuristics, they argue, provide us with an ‘adaptive toolbox’
(Gigerenzer, 2008; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999), each suited to a particular set of challenges endemic to a particular environ-
ment. In contrast with unbounded models of classical rationality, which typically assume unlimited resources both with
regard to information gathering and computational processing, ecological rationality is ‘fast and frugal’. According to
Gigerenzer and Todd (1999, p. 13), a heuristic is ecologically rational ‘to the degree that it is adapted to the structure of
an environment’. Heuristics are quick and computationally cheap, requiring few and simple computational steps, and oper-
ating on a limited input domain. For example, when confronted with two objects, only one of which is recognized, people
infer that the familiar one will be more important or have a greater value. Although this so-called ‘recognition heuristic’
– on which more later – leads us astray in artiﬁcial set-ups, it appears to be a surprisingly accurate guide to real world prob-
lems (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002).
Proponents of ecological rationality claim that many apparent demonstrations of irrationality in the heuristics and biases
program are artefacts of inappropriate standards and narrow norms, such as coherence criteria and the axioms of probability
theory. Indeed, many experiments are expressly designed to mislead or distract participants, placing them in situations
where their usually successful strategies and heuristics lead them astray. If one canvasses the same phenomena in a broader
framework, however, taking into account the structure of real environments, computational limitations and various trade-
offs, the human mind emerges as more rational than many psychologists suppose.
2.2. Two strands
We detect two major strands in the re-appreciation of (apparent) human irrationality as ecologically rational. On the one
hand, as the ecological rationalist points out, traditional cognitive psychologists have too often delighted in tripping up their
subjects with artiﬁcial set-ups that truncate the complexity of real life and human intelligence (ﬁrst strand). On the other1 In his latest work, Kahneman is at pains to disavow this pessimistic turn: ‘‘I often cringe when my work with Amos is credited with demonstrating that
human choices are irrational, when in fact our research only showed that humans are not well described by the rational-agent model’’ (Kahneman, 2011, p.
411).
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environments. If putatively ‘irrational’ subjects were tested in an ecologically relevant context, the kind to which their
evolved heuristics are attuned, they would behave rationally (second strand).
In both strands, ecological rationality focuses our attention on the match between our reasoning and the real world. The
sensible argument behind this is that we should evaluate heuristics in their ‘proper’ context. You should not use a screw-
driver as a crowbar and be surprised that it breaks.2 Whereas the ﬁrst strand focuses on artiﬁcial set-ups and uncharitable
experimenters, the second strand invokes evolutionary rationales. In the latter case, advocates of ecological rationality point
out that heuristics are crafted by evolution to deal with particular adaptive problems in an ancestral environment. Therefore,
they have a ‘‘proper domain’’ of application (Sperber, 1996) – what Millikan (1984) termed ‘‘Normal conditions’’ – outside of
which we should not expect them to perform well. Blaming them for ‘‘malfunction’’ in unnatural contexts, without proper
appreciation of their design features, is like blaming the screwdriver. Nevertheless, as we will argue, while the former approach
is (often) warranted, the latter involves problematic locus shifts.
2.3. Evolutionary psychology
This second evolutionary strand runs throughmuch of the literature on ecological rationality, (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002).
And indeed, the program connects with work in the ﬁeld of evolutionary psychology on the adaptive value of cognitive bias
(Aktipis & Kurzban, 2004; Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Haselton & Nettle, 2006; Haselton, Nettle, & Andrews, 2005; Mercier &
Sperber, 2011; Nesse, 2001), the main thrust of which is also to show the ecological validity of human reason. As Haselton &
Nettle write:
Some cognitive illusions disappear or greatly attenuate when the task is presented in an ecologically valid format
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). Ecological validity, a long-standing but undertheorized term
in psychology, may in effect be equated to the task format approximating some task that humans have performed recur-
rently over evolutionary time.
[Haselton & Nettle, 2006, p. 63]
Apparent biases and illusions are recast in an evolutionary light, as serving some adaptive rationale. From an adaptation-
ist point of view, human reason is not the botched and bias-riddled device many psychologists take it to be, but emerges as
an extremely effective, highly specialized set of adaptive tools for dealing with recurring problems in the Environment of
Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA).
In an overview of the research program of ecological rationality, Gerd Gigerenzer wrote that ‘what appears to be a fallacy
can often also be seen as adaptive behaviour, if one is willing to rethink the norms’ (Gigerenzer, 2008, p. 13). In a similar vein,
Haselton and Nettle (2006, p. 59) have argued that ‘bias in cognition is no longer a shortcoming in rational behaviour, but an
adaptation of behaviour to a complex, uncertain world’. Elsewhere, Haselton and colleagues wrote ‘an adaptationist perspec-
tive suggests that the mind is remarkably well designed for important problems of survival and reproduction, and not fun-
damentally irrational.’ These assessments seem to provide solace for the pessimistic view of human reason voiced by many
psychologists. But can evolution really get us off the hook?
3. Assessment of the locus shift in ecological rationality
3.1. Minimal conditions for rationality
In order to assess what exactly ecological/adaptive rationality amounts to, we need a serviceable conception of rational-
ity. While attempting to formulate a full blown deﬁnition seems doomed to fail, given the loose and varied use of the term,
some constraints on the meaning of ‘rationality’ will guide us through this treacherous terrain. In this paper, we will be
mainly concerned with epistemic rationality (belief formation that is accurate and truth-tracking) and not so much with
instrumental rationality (actions that maximize the probability of success, according to some standard). According to De
Sousa (2009, p. 289), rationality presupposes intentionality. An inanimate object or mere mechanism cannot be rational.
It would be absurd to claim that a rock falling to the ground is rationally obeying the laws of gravity, much as it would
be strange to call a calculator rational because it yields correct answers. Likewise, irrationality is a concept that can be mean-
ingfully applied only to intentional creatures – entities capable of full-blown rationality (de Sousa, 2007). Irrationality is a
term of epistemic disapprobation, used when someone fails to live up to some expected normative standard. As ought
implies can, it makes no sense to blame a mindless process:
It makes sense to criticize a person, but not a cell, for having made a mistake in computation, or with having failed to
foresee what should have been foreseen, or with having acted on reasons that fell short of the best set of reasons.
[de Sousa, 2007, p. 11]2 There is a range of possibilities as to the selection of heuristics. They can be consciously crafted and selected to tackle certain problems (through individual
learning) or, they can be crafted by evolution though applied consciously, or learned (reinforced) through habit and applied unconsciously, etc. (see Marewski &
Schooler, 2011; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006).
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ality, including biological adaptations and artefacts, even when no intentionality is involved. Although natural selection is a
mindless process, it can produce an appearance of intentionality by crafting design solutions to recurring adaptive problems
(Williams, 1966/1996). Evolution by natural selection gives rise to what Dennett coined ‘free-ﬂoating rationales’ (Dennett,
1983, p. 351). In this extended sense of rationality, the relevant measure of success is equated with reproductive success or
inclusive ﬁtness (Over, 2000), and standard frameworks of rationality such as game theory (Maynard Smith, 1974) or
expected utility theory (see Section 3.2) can be applied (Kacelnik, 2006).
Because of the absence of intentionality, however, not all dimensions of full-blown rationality can be transferred to evo-
lution. Whereas individual reasoners are capable of foresight, evolution cannot look into the future. For example, selection
can easily get stuck on local peaks in an adaptive landscape, unable to reach nearby higher summits. If evolution had the
capacity of foresight, it would backtrack and make a detour, as a human reasoner would. Evolution, therefore, provides a
mere ‘simulacrum of rationality’ (de Sousa, 2009, p. 298).
3.2. Locus shifts
Given that rationality (in the literal sense) can only be attributed to person-level decision making (see above), we ques-
tion whether the ecological reframing succeeds in dispelling the charge of irrationality. In order to get clear about the notion
of ‘locus shifts’, we ﬁrst discuss an example from evolutionary psychology in which a similar calculus of rationality may be
implemented either at the individual level or on an evolutionary scale: error management. This will allow us to pull apart the
two loci of rationality, while holding the measure of success (e.g. protection from bodily harm) constant.
Expected utility theory is one of the hallmarks of classical rationality: it describes how to maximize utility under uncer-
tainty, as a function of the probability of different outcomes and their associated costs and beneﬁts. Normally, the model is
used to describe individual choices, for example betting preferences. In recent years, however, the logic of expected utility
theory has been extended to evolutionary adaptations, under the guise of error management theory (Haselton & Buss, 2000;
Haselton & Nettle, 2006; Nesse, 2001).3 In a range of different situations, organisms need to process ambiguous stimuli that
may or may not signal adaptively relevant situations, such as the presence of a predator or pathogen. If the costs associated
with the respective errors, measured in terms of (inclusive) reproductive ﬁtness, are asymmetric, then expected utility theory
can be applied to predict optimal behaviour. If the costs associated with one type of error are larger than those associated with
the opposite kind, then a strategy biased in favour of making the less costly error may pay off in the long run, even if that
increases the absolute numbers of errors (Arkes, 1991). As Haselton et al. put it: ‘it is better to make more errors overall as long
as they are of the relatively cheap kind’ (Haselton et al., 2005, p. 731). Error management is displayed in a range of biological
adaptations that are clearly beyond our voluntary control, such as inﬂammation, disgust, fever and coughing. In all of these
cases, the locus of rationality is clearly evolution by natural selection, not the individual subject.
Things get more interesting when considering applications of error management theory to human cognition. In such
cases, the locus of rationality may reside either at the individual level or at the evolutionary level. In most discussions of
error management, human behavioural biases are interpreted in terms of biased belief, with evolution as the rational book-
keeper. For example, people buy into various superstitions because they evolved pattern detection modules that err on the
side of caution. In order not to miss out on any important causal patterns in the world, evolution has ‘decided’ to run the risk
of occasional false positives, which are mostly relatively harmless.
In a commentary on error management theory, however, McKay and Efferson (2010) argued that human behavioural bias
does not automatically entail biased belief. In principle, the same behavioural bias may be arrived at through accurate belief
formation combined with judicious action policies, based on expected utility theory. If I react to a rustle in the leaves as if
there is a predator lurking in the bushes, I do not need a strong belief that a predator is there. Likewise, when approaching a
girl that I like, I do not need to be certain that she fancies me. I may decide to act upon an admittedly remote possibility, in
light of the high opportunity costs associated with false negatives (ending up as lunch, or missing a romantic – read repro-
ductive – opportunity). As McKay & Efferson noted, ‘there are inﬁnitely many ways to accomplish the required behavioural
change . . . inferences about cognition can be radically underdetermined when one observes an interesting behavioural bias.’
(see also Marshall, Trimmer, Houston, & McNamara, 2013; McKay & Efferson, 2010, p. 312).
The logic underlying the behavioural bias is the same, but our normative appraisal of human reasoners depends on where
the locus of rationality resides. If the behavioural bias is the outcome of a prudential action policy, without the involvement
of biased belief, we should not accuse reasoners of irrationality. For example, people fasten their seatbelts before starting the
car not because they strongly believe they will crash into other cars, but just because they would rather be safe than sorry:
the cost of a false negative (being ﬂung through the windscreen) is orders of magnitude larger than that of a false positive
(the energy expended in fastening one’s seatbelt and the mild discomfort of being strapped in it), large enough to offset the
small probability of a serious car accident. This is a case of full-blown (intentional) rationality, situated at the level of indi-
vidual decision making. An alien scientist interpreting this prudential human behaviour as a symptom of irrational paranoia
would be very uncharitable indeed. On the other hand, if a behavioural bias stems from some attendant belief distortion, the3 Here we ignore the point that error management theory is based on optimization, which would be a problematic form of unbounded rationality in
Gigerenzer’s framework. However, in this section we are simply trying to pry apart two loci of rationality, and so we can ignore different conceptions of
rationality for the time being.
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that he is irresistible to the opposite sex, we may be justiﬁed in calling him irrational.
If biased behaviour translates to bias in belief formation, however, with evolution keeping the books of ﬁtness costs and
beneﬁts, we think our assessment should be different (for a discussion, see Galperin & Haselton, 2012). From the adaptation-
ist point of view, the ecological ‘problem’ of exploiting causal regularities in an organism’s environment can be solved by
different means: a ﬁxed and genetically encoded action sequence, the capacity to form conditional reﬂexes and make asso-
ciations, a belief formation system with a pre-programmed belief bias, or the genuine capacity for causal thought and
expected utility reasoning (Dennett, 1996; Lorenz, 1941/2009). Only in the latter case is rationality displayed at the locus
of the individual decision-maker. For example, many people engage in superstitious rituals because they strongly believe
in the causal connection. If error management theorists are right, there is indeed method in the madness of such superstition,
since the ﬁtness cost of overlooking causal links outweighs the ﬁtness cost of detecting non-existent causal relationships. In
such cases, however, the locus of ‘rationality’ pertains to the adaptive design of our reasoning faculties. Although it is tempt-
ing to collapse both levels of rationality, as though the adaptive rationale of our superstitious behaviour redounds to the
human reasoner, the ‘method’ of natural selection does not obviate – indeed it requires – the ‘madness’ of the individual.
Accordingly, we defend the following claims:
(a) We should not credit human reasoners simply because the adaptive design of their reasoning faculties conforms to
some standard principles of rationality.4 We do not congratulate people for their sophisticated immune systems or inge-
nious thermoregulation, nor do we credit cicadas for having discovered prime numbers,5 or spiders for the beautiful
geometry of their webs. There is neither cognitive transparency – the organism has no clue why it behaves as it does
– nor intentional action. According to Dennett, If we discover that an animal is too simple-minded to harbour an adaptive
rationale, we do not discard the rationale but are simply forced to ‘pass the rationale from the individual to the evolving
genotype’ (Dennett, 1983, p. 351).
(b) Conversely, if we have good grounds for calling someone’s beliefs irrational (see further), thenmerely pointing out the
larger evolutionary rationale of the faculties generating those beliefs will not get him off the hook. Having biologically
adaptive cognition is not an alibi where the charge of irrationality is concerned. If superstitious belief is adaptive,
because it motivates ‘better safe than sorry’ behaviours, that does not make superstitious people rational. For example,
while people who believe that black cats are harbingers of bad luck may be heeding to the ‘wisdom’ of time-honoured
cognitive adaptations, that does not make their belief rational or truth-tracking.
3.3. The rationality of heuristics?
3.3.1. Statistical rationales
In the classical heuristics-and-biases framework, heuristics are perceived as imperfect shortcuts in an uncertain world,
strategies that execute a trade-off between cost and accuracy. Gigerenzer and his colleagues, however, have documented
several cases where this trade-off can be escaped, and ‘less information and computation lead to more accurate judgments’
(Gigerenzer & Sturm, 2012, p. 261). The showpiece of these ‘less is more’ effects is the recognition heuristic, where people
take advantage of their own ignorance to make intelligent inferences. In judging which out of two cities has a larger popu-
lation, for example, people use name recognition as a cue for population level. When the task consists of German cities,
American subjects perform better than their German colleagues, because the latter recognize too many cities to exploit their
own ignorance. A measure of ignorance turns out to be proﬁtable in this case (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002), while knowing
too much is a burden. Apparently, everyday life presents us with many situations in which the recognition heuristic proves
successful. It provides us with a powerful and accurate tool for making inferences about the environment.
Fast and frugal heuristics escape a trade-off between accuracy and speed because ‘they make a trade-off on another
dimension: that of generality versus speciﬁcity’ (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999, p. 18). In later work, Gigerenzer and Brighton
(2009) have explored another dilemma (between bias and variance) for explaining when and why such ‘less-is-more’ effects
occur. The upshot of this statistical analysis is that the simplicity of fast and frugal heuristics (few computational steps and
few parameters) protects them against overﬁtting (i.e. mistaking noise for underlying patterns) and hence ensures robust-
ness in the face of environmental change.
The success of the recognition heuristic derives from a probabilistic rationale. In order for the trick to work, there needs to
be a correlation between the probability that an item is recognized and the value of interest. This ‘recognition validity’ needs
to outweigh the ‘knowledge validity’, which is the probability of giving the correct answer when both items are recognized
(Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999, 2002). In other words, your ignorance must be more valuable than your knowledgeability. In
addition, success depends on the degree of uncertainty, the number of alternatives, and the size of the learning sample. Gold-
stein & Gigerenzer conclude:4 Nor, of course, should we criticise people for the limitations of their automatic, non-reﬂective cognition.
5 Cicadas have developed a life cycle with prime-number year intervals (e.g. 17 years), because that makes it difﬁcult for predating species to ‘track’ them. If
they had a life cycle of 15 years, say, predators could show up every 3 or 5 years, never missing their prey. With a 17-year interval, however, predators with a 5-
year life cycle catch the cicadas only once every 80 years.
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mindedness and irrationality. This is not our view. The recognition heuristic is not only a reasonable cognitive adaptation
because there are situations of limited knowledge in which there is little else one can do. It is also adaptive because there
are situations . . . in which missing information results in more accurate inferences than a considerable amount of knowl-
edge can achieve.
[Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999, p. 58]
Now what should we make of this contrast between simple-mindedness and ‘reasonable cognitive adaptation’? Can we
attribute rationality to heuristic-wielding human thinkers when their heuristics yield accurate inferences?
3.3.2. Cognitive transparency
The answer to this question depends on the criteria of cognitive transparency and intentionality. As pointed out, attribu-
tion of (literal) rationality requires intentional deliberation on the part of the actor, not just the execution of hard-wired
action patterns or mindless heuristics. (cf. 3.1 Minimal conditions for rationality). To avoid regress of justiﬁcation, of course,
we should not require that the agent has contemplated every step in the chain of belief-formation. Perceptual beliefs may
arise automatically, without deliberation and thus without rationality, but more complex beliefs can be formed consciously
on the basis of basic perceptual beliefs. On the latter level, attributions of rationality and irrationality can be meaningfully
made.6
Without delving into empirical details, we can be conﬁdent that many people are ignorant of the statistical principles
underlying the success of the recognition heuristic. This is hardly surprising if the heuristic is a ‘cognitive adaptation’, as
Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) suggest. Many cognitive modules in our brain perform their proper function without us
having the slightest awareness of their operation, let alone their design features and the reasons for their success. If the rec-
ognition heuristic is an evolved adaptation, activated under appropriate circumstances by a mechanism to which human
cognizers have no access, it would be strange to credit people for its success. The locus of rationality, in this case, is at
the level of adaptation. Evolution, rather than human cognizers, has exploited recurrent statistical correlations in the
environment.
However, recent research shows that some people who use the heuristic articulate a justiﬁcation that captures the eco-
logical validity (Gigerenzer, 2007, pp. 125–126), and they will suspend the use of the heuristic if they have good counter-
indications (Pachur, Todd, Gigerenzer, Schooler, & Goldstein, 2011). Even if such reasoners have no full understanding of
the statistical principles involved, it seems that the criterion of transparency is satisﬁed, and it would be uncharitable to deny
them rationality at the personal level.
In general, however, the evidence points in the other direction
Research suggests that people hardly ever make conscious decisions about which heuristic to use but that they quickly
and unconsciously tend to adapt heuristics to changing environments, provided there is feedback.
[Gigerenzer, 2008, p. 38]
In another striking example from the catalogue of fast and frugal heuristics, both humans and dogs use the following rule
of thumb to catch a ball in ﬂight: keep your gaze ﬁxed at the ball, and adjust your running speed such that the angle of the
ball in your visual ﬁeld remains constant (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). If baseball players are asked to predict where a ball will
land, but are not allowed to run towards it, they perform very poorly (Babler & Dannemiller, 1993). However, when asked
how they proceed to catch a ball on the ﬂy, people are typically oblivious of using the heuristic: ‘most ﬁelders are blithely
unaware of the gaze heuristic, despite its simplicity’ (Gigerenzer, 2007, p. 11). This, it should be emphasised, does not mean
that heuristic-wielding humans are irrational, but that the normative categories of (ir)rationality simply do not apply insofar
as humans are working on automatic pilot.
Interestingly, on some occasions, Gigerenzer & Todd explicitly credit evolution for the design of heuristics: ‘evolution
would seize upon informative environmental dependencies such as this one and exploit them with speciﬁc heuristics if they
would give a decision-making organism an adaptive edge’ (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999, p. 19). Such statements, however, are in
tension with the main thrust of their research programme, which is to dispel accusations of ‘simple-mindedness’ and
irrationality by pointing to the larger ecological picture. As we saw in the example of error management, adaptive design
is perfectly compatible with dumbness.
In this regard, the novel insights gleaned from Gigerenzer et al.’s research program conﬂict with their aspiration to
rehabilitate human reason. Indeed, if the rationale of the recognition heuristic or the gaze heuristic were transparent to
those proﬁting from it, the results of Gigerenzer et al. would not have been so informative. The effectiveness of these
heuristics is surprising even to the researchers themselves. For example, another deceptively simple heuristic, ‘take
the best’, which takes the ﬁrst discriminative cue between two items and ignores the other cues, has outperformed
weighted statistical decision procedures such as multiple regression. This is how Gigerenzer & Goldstein relate their
amazement at their own result: ‘When we ﬁrst obtained these results, we could not believe them.’ (Gigerenzer &
Todd, 1999, p. 89).6 There is no reason to assume that this is an all-or-nothing affair: there may be degrees of transparency and conscious deliberation.
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where their heuristics lead them astray.7 For example, many advertisers exploit the recognition heuristic by investing in brand
recognition rather than product quality, thereby undermining the ecological validity of the correlation between renown and
product quality and fooling consumers. In the ‘overnight fame’ experiments by Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, and Jasechko (1989), peo-
ple who had been presented with unknown names the day before were tricked into believing that those names were famous.
This should not come as a surprise. Evolution exploits recurring statistical properties of the environment of evolutionary adap-
tiveness (EEA), but it is not responsive to any environmental contingency. For evolution it is ‘rational’ to implement the recog-
nition heuristic in an organism as long as overshooting or misﬁring has been sufﬁciently rare or inconsequential in the EEA.
Error management on the evolutionary scale abstracts away from local contingencies.
3.4. Why adaptive ‘rationality’ does not align with personal rationality
In the section on error management, we noted that adaptively ‘rational’ cognition may translate into irrational belief, such
as superstition. There are two additional reasons why evolutionary rationality and personal rationality may diverge. The ﬁrst
is the so-called problem of adaptive mismatch. If heuristics are evolved adaptations for managing cost asymmetries in the
EEA, there is no guarantee that the same balance sheet still applies to modern environments. Probabilities may have changed
over time, as may have the respective costs and beneﬁts. This mismatch hypothesis is one of the main tenets of evolutionary
psychology (Pinker, 1997; Tooby & Cosmides, 1994).8 A heuristic may succeed in the EEA but fail in modern environments, or
only match some limited aspects of modern environments (e.g. to predict which city will have the largest population).
A second reason concerns the issue of who – or rather what – is the ultimate beneﬁciary of natural selection (cui bono?
see Dennett, 1995). As Dawkins (1976) has pointed out, following up on pioneering work by Williams and Hamilton
(Hamilton, 1963; Williams, 1966/1996), genes can be seen as the ultimate beneﬁciaries of evolutionary adaptation. Individ-
ual organisms are best seen as ‘vehicles’ for genetic propagation (Dawkins, 1982). Take, for instance, the suicidal sting of a
bee. Such behaviour is ‘rational’ from the point of the evolutionary processes that gave rise to such behaviour, because the
bee shares 75% of its genes with its sisters. Sacriﬁcing its life to enhance the survival chances of the hive therefore makes
sense from a gene-centric perspective. But it certainly does not beneﬁt the individual bee. Evolutionary rationality – which
is situated at the level of the replicators – therefore does not always coincide with rationality at the level of the vehicle
(Skyrms, 2000; Stanovich & West, 2000; Stanovich & West, 2003).
4. Genuine fallacies
Let us now have a closer look at two famous examples from the irrationality literature, where advocates of ecological
rationality have performed a locus shift: the gambler’s fallacy and the hot hand fallacy. The former refers to the belief of rou-
lette players that numbers which have not turned up yet are more likely to win in the next round, because they are ‘overdue’.
In reality, of course, each turn of the roulette wheel is independent of the next. The wheel has no memory, so the probability
distribution remains the same at every trial. More generally, the gambler’s fallacy describes the belief that statistical devi-
ations in a given direction will soon be counterbalanced by deviations in the opposite direction.
The hot hand fallacy can be seen as the mirror image of the gambler’s fallacy. To commit the hot hand fallacy is to believe
that, if some deviation from chance has been observed, further deviations in the same direction are more likely on subse-
quent trials. The name derives from basketball, where there is a widespread belief among players and fans that players score
in streaks (Gilovich, 1983; Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985). If one player has already scored well, he has a ‘hot hand’ and is
more likely to make further points during the rest of the game. If he makes a bad start, however, there is a jinx on him and he
will be less likely to performwell during the rest of the match. Statistical analyses of basketball scoring data have revealed no
such clustering (but see Raab, Gula, & Gigerenzer, 2012, for evidence of streakiness in volleyball), but belief in the hot hand
persists.9
The fact that each of these forms of inference has been bestowed its proper label in the literature, despite their being one
another’s mirror image, is a source of amusement to Gigerenzer and his colleagues. For them, it exempliﬁes the bad habit of
psychologists to label any observed deviation from accepted rationality models as a ‘fallacy’ or ‘bias’, without any under-
standing of the underlying cognitive mechanisms (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009).7 Intelligent choice in the face of contingencies is one of the hallmarks of rationality. Perhaps people do not fully understand why the heuristics they employ
work, but they may know when to implement them. In particular, they may make ﬂexible use of the different tools in their mental toolkit, switching strategies
in the face of local circumstances and feedback. This interesting empirical issue is still under investigation. Although research suggests that people adapt their
heuristics to the local situation and to performance feedback through a process of reinforcement learning (Rieskamp and Otto, 2006), that does not prevent
heuristics from overshooting or being misapplied.
8 Standard examples of mismatch include our craving for fat and sugar (leading to widespread obesity), or our disproportionate fear of spiders (given that
very few people succumb to spider bites), compared to our carelessness about moving cars and electricity sockets (which are far more hazardous).
9 It is worth pointing out that the hot hand hypothesis is not per se implausible, and certainly would not overthrow our current understanding of the world
(as with the gambler’s fallacy). Maybe players who start a game well get a boost of conﬁdence, and those who start out badly experience more stress, which
further lowers their performance.
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in most natural environments, a succession of events is not statistically independent: the probability of an event changes in
function of earlier occurrences.
Many events work like that. They have a characteristic life history, a changing probability of occurring over time which
statisticians call a hazard function. An astute observer should commit the gambler’s fallacy and try to predict the next
occurrence of an event from its history so far . . .
[Pinker, 1997, p. 346]
Roulette wheels, with their smooth and radially symmetric design, are expressly designed to foil this heuristic, according
to Pinker: ‘in any world without casinos, the gambler’s fallacy is rarely a fallacy’ (Pinker, 1997). Indeed, our ability to spot
statistical dependencies between events in real-life may often prove very useful. That morale even holds for chance games
outside the idealized world of casinos. If I play a dice game at a fair and the dice land on 12 a couple of times in a row, it is not
unreasonable to predict that they will do so the next time too – because they are probably rigged. In general, as Bennis et al.
have written, ‘casino games [are] exquisitely designed to exploit otherwise adaptive heuristics to the casino’s advantage’
(Bennis, Katsikopoulos, Goldstein, Dieckmann, & Berg, 2009, p. 421). Taleb (2008) has referred to the inappropriate applica-
tion of pure and simpliﬁed models of probability to real life as the ‘ludic fallacy’. Intuitions that lead us astray in the rareﬁed
and idealized world of casinos, may prove very useful in real-life situations.
If I am presented with some strange device that churns out black and white balls, and I do not have access to its inner
working, I may be forgiven for thinking that there is a statistical dependence between different trials. I may even be perfectly
justiﬁed in doing so, extrapolating from earlier experience. An experienced gambler in a casino, by contrast, possesses all the
requisite evidence he needs to conclude that this is not a machine to which his pattern detection heuristics will apply. If even
a crash course in statistics and a careful inspection of the roulette wheel fail to cure him of his habit of thought, then we may,
pace Pinker, call his reasoning fallacious.
The natural way to construe Pinker’s argument is as a point about adaptation. Given that pure randomness is rare in the
EEA (as it most probably still is today in natural environments), it made sense for evolution to endow us with a knack for
spotting patterns, with the minor side-effect of making us vulnerable to (fair) dice games and roulette wheels. After enduring
ﬁve straight days of rainy weather, as Pinker notices, it would have made sense for the optimistic early hominid to expect a
sunny spell. As weather ﬂuctuation often follows statistical patterns, the sun can really be ‘overdue’. For evolution, it makes
sense to ‘gamble’ on the kind of environments with a speciﬁc hazard function, and to disregard the abstractions of casino
wheels, which did not feature in ancestral environments. In a similar vein, the hot hand fallacy may arise from a heuristic
adapted to environments with positive temporal autocorrelation or ‘clumping’ (Fawcett et al., 2014; Wilke & Barrett, 2009).
But what does that say about us? Are we forgiven for using the heuristic anyway, even in the face of countervailing infor-
mation? Personal-level rationality involves the ability to use contingent information about the problem task in order to
understand which strategies are conducive to success. A rational person should reﬂect upon the deliverances of her intu-
itions and rules of thumb, and disregard them when she has good reasons to believe that they lead her astray (Over,
2000). Irrationality often stems from what Fiedler and Wänke (2004, 2013) have called ‘meta-cognitive myopia’, or the
inability to critically evaluate intuitive heuristics and use them in appropriate settings. In the case of casinos, there is indeed
an alternative course of action available. Many experienced gamblers, though still feeling the intuitive pull of the
pattern-seeking heuristic, suppress or resist it in practice, because they realize that the wheel has no memory and every turn
is independent of all the others. Surely (Dennett, 2013) such players are more ‘rational’ than the ones who succumb to the
gambler’s fallacy, in all of the senses we explored: they understand the justiﬁcation of their beliefs, they intentionally aim for
a speciﬁc goal, and they will be more successful in attaining it. Indeed, one of the hallmarks of (human) rationality is our
ability to reﬂectively evaluate and cross-validate the output of our cognitive modules, and to overrule their intuitive hunches
when the context calls for it. In this regard, whereas Pinker emphasises that the gambler’s fallacy is not a fallacy in a world
without casinos, we emphasise that it is nevertheless a fallacy in a world with casinos.
As de Sousa points out, the rational ‘strategies’ attributed to natural selection are conceived in the most general terms, on
the basis of phylogenetic ‘experiences’ and without precise reference to the circumstances under which they may be imple-
mented. By contrast, individual rational agents face particular problems in possibly unique circumstances (de Sousa, 2007, p.
137). Rationality, in this perspective, consists of using our reasoning abilities appropriately to deal with the situation at hand,
not blindly following heuristics of which – with hindsight – we can appreciate the adaptive rationale.
5. Ecological rationality restored
5.1. Conjunction fallacy?
Does the program of ecological rationality always involve locus shifts, and their attendant problems of transparency and
intentionality? No. The second strand of the program of ‘‘ecological rationality’’ (Section 2.2), does not depend on adaptive
considerations, and hence does not involve locus shifts. The ‘ecological’ dimension of rationality, in this strand, concerns the
real-life contexts of human reasoning, which are typically truncated in artiﬁcial lab experiments. To illustrate this difference,
we will brieﬂy consider two examples of alleged human bias that have been reinterpreted under the banner of ‘‘ecological
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rationality. Consider the following classic test:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply con-
cerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.
Which is more probable?
(A) Linda is a bank teller.
(B) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.
In their original research on what became known as the ‘Linda problem’, Kahneman & Tversky held human reasoners
accountable to the conjunction rule: B cannot be more probable than A, because it is an accepted rule of probability theory
that the conjunction of two events can never be more probable than either of its members. Still, the majority of subjects
answered B.
Gigerenzer, however, pointed out that terms such as ‘and’ and ‘probable’ are polysemous. ‘Probable’ can also mean plau-
sible, sensible, or supported by evidence (Gigerenzer, 1996; Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999). Kahneman & Tversky expect sub-
jects to interpret ‘probable’ in the sense of mathematical probability. As a number of researchers have pointed out, however
(Adler, 1984; Dulany & Hilton, 1991; Hilton, 1995), this construal violates pragmatic rules of conversational inference, in par-
ticular the maxim of relevance (Grice, 1989). According to this maxim, it makes little sense to adopt the notion of mathe-
matical probability in answering the Linda problem, given all the additional (and hence presumably relevant) information
presented. If subjects interpret the task as Kahneman & Tversky want them to, the little vignette about Linda is rendered
completely irrelevant to the task, and the ‘correct’ answer depends solely on the logical operator ‘AND’ and the mathematical
meaning of ‘probable’. Why would the researcher present such an elaborate description of Linda’s character and background,
if it were completely irrelevant? In addition, subjects can reasonably interpret the ﬁrst statement as implying that Linda is
not active in the feminist movement. These ambiguities can be ruled out by presenting the task in terms of natural frequen-
cies, or by including another question that makes the description of Linda relevant, so that the (overall) task does not violate
the maxim of relevance. After such modiﬁcations, as it turns out, subjects reason in accordance with the conjunction rule
(Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999).10 Given that simple application of the conjunction rule glosses over the conversational subtleties
and ambiguities of the situation, a number of critics have argued that Kahneman & Tversky’s interpretation is uncharitable (e.g.
Margolis, 1987), and even that they, and not their subjects, have failed to grasp the logic of the Linda problem (Hertwig &
Gigerenzer, 1999): ‘human intelligence reaches far beyond narrow logical norms. In fact, the conjunction problems become triv-
ial and devoid of intellectual challenge when people ﬁnally realize that they are intended as a content-free logical exercise’
(Gigerenzer, 2008, p. 73).
5.2. Base rate fallacy?
Another case of alleged irrationality that (at least partly) disappears when cast in an appropriate real world environment,
instead of an artiﬁcial and misleading set-up, is the infamous base rate fallacy (Casscells, Schoenberger, & Graboys, 1978;
Kahneman et al., 1982, p. 154). For example, when estimating the probability that a patient has contracted a particular dis-
ease, physicians are (sometimes) found to ignore the base rate of the disease in question. Information about the reliability of
the test appears to be the sole determinant of their judgment, while the statistical prevalence of the disease in the population
group is ignored.
However, as Gigerenzer noted, real life is more complicated
Clinicians, however, know that patients are usually not randomly selected—except in large survey studies—but rather
‘select’ themselves by exhibiting symptoms of the disease. In the absence of random sampling, it is unclear what to do
with the base rates speciﬁed.
[Gigerenzer, 1991, p. 9]
If patients are not randomly sampled, Gigerenzer notes, physicians cannot be accused of committing the base rate fallacy.
Indeed, given that real world environments, as opposed to convenient mathematical idealizations, do not typically proffer
random samples, the judgment of the clinicians is perfectly defensible. In a series of experiments conducted by
Gigerenzer and et al. (1988), people were found to be capable of factoring in base rates, provided they were ‘convinced’ that
the sample was randomly drawn from the population. Inviting subjects to blindly draw patients’ names from an urn proved
effective in overruling their prior beliefs, whereas merely pointing out random sampling in the problem description did not.
Even though non-random sampling appears to be an intuitive default assumption, these experiments show that people
can and will – given sufﬁcient commitment – account for base rates when necessary. Indeed, as Gigerenzer points out, with10 However, in Kahneman’s defense, other experiments show that, even if the Linda problem is presented in a frequency format, which is reputedly
ecologically valid, biased reasoning does sometimes – though not always – persist. (Mellers, Hertwig, & Kahneman, 2001).
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the label ‘base rate fallacy’ suggests. If Bayesian problems are couched in terms of frequencies, as opposed to abstract math-
ematical probability, it turns out that the ‘fallacy’ largely disappears (but see Kahneman & Tversky, 1996; Sloman, Over,
Slovak, & Stibel, 2003). In other words, it is not that most people lack the requisite skills to integrate base rate information
(Zhu & Gigerenzer, 2006). Provided that there is sufﬁciently strong indication of random sampling, and that base rate infor-
mation is presented in a concrete, accessible way, people’s reasoning approximates Bayesian theory (Cosmides & Tooby,
1996; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). Once again, Gigerenzer and colleagues argue that the ‘fallacy’ is elicited by the artiﬁcial
or experimental set-ups, and evaporates when transferred to real life. It is important to note that whether and to what extent
the conjunction and base rate fallacies disappear when problems are presented in ecologically valid formats is still hotly
debated. This, however, is a matter of experimental psychology. The point we are making is merely that the approach taken
in these cases does not involve a problematic locus shift.5.3. Analysis
Wherein lies the difference between the latter cases and the problematic ones we discussed earlier, given that both
involve a form of ‘ecological’ reframing? In Gigerenzer’s deﬂation of the ‘conjunction fallacy’ or the ‘base rate fallacy’, the
gestalt switch also involves adopting a broader view, casting human inference-making in a rich and real world environment.
In these examples, however, the force of the ecological gestalt switch derives not from any shift to the adaptive rationale of
their heuristics, but from the fact that human reasoners had not been given sufﬁcient information to disambiguate the prob-
lem at hand and to home in on the interpretation intended by the experiments. In particular, subjects did not know – or were
not properly committed to the belief – that they were dealing with an artiﬁcial situation in which the normal richness and
ecological complexity of problem solving should be ignored. How were Kahneman & Tversky’s subjects supposed to know
that their experimenters were interested in a ‘silly’ question that violates an accepted rule of sensible conversation? Why
should they have interpreted the problem in the sense of mathematical probability, contra their intuition that this made
the whole story about Linda irrelevant? Similarly, why should the physicians have realized they were expected to take a step
back from their regular practice, considering an unrealistic case in which a subject is randomly drawn from the population at
large. Remember that, when Gigerenzer (1991) committed subjects to the mathematical interpretation, their reasoning con-
formed to the conjunction rule. The force of the argument from ecological rationality here is not that ‘we can design exper-
iments in which cognitive illusions disappear’ (Kahneman, 2003, p. 711), as Kahneman construes Gigerenzer’s point, but that
there was no illusion in the ﬁrst place.6. Conclusion
In order to understand the strengths and frailties of human reason within a naturalized framework, an evolutionary per-
spective is invaluable. We applaud the program of ecological rationality for taking the evolutionary roots of (human) cogni-
tion seriously. If one tries to dispel apparent instances of human irrationality, however, one should not take recourse to
ultimate, evolutionary alibis. The foibles of reason cannot be exculpated simply because they display some evolutionary
rationale, whether arising from error management, adaptive bias, or somemismatch between evolved heuristics andmodern
environments. It is no criticism of a screwdriver (or its human designer) to note that it makes a poor crowbar – but this does
not exculpate the DIY enthusiast who uses a screwdriver as a lever. Likewise, we can admire the adaptive or functional
design of a heuristic while still impugning the rationality of individuals who blindly misapply it – and should know better.
Conversely, evidence of adaptive cognitive design is not evidence of human rationality. We cannot fully congratulate our-
selves on our ‘rational’ behaviour unless we have some cognitive access to the goal we want to achieve, our strategy for
attaining it, and our reasons for thinking this strategy is or might be successful. Insofar as humans are working on automatic
pilot, proﬁting from (or being misled by) the wisdom of their evolved heuristics, the normative categories of (ir)rationality do
not apply. Genuine rationality presupposes an intentional striving for success.
The program of ecological rationality has pursued two distinct projects, although the distinction between these has been
underappreciated. In its best moments, it has convincingly demonstrated that the rigid application of content-blind logical
norms as a benchmark of rationality produces an uncharitable view of human cognition, a view insensitive to the subtlety
and richness of human reasoning. On the other hand, advocates of ecological rationality, together with evolutionary psychol-
ogists, have also pointed out the adaptive rationale of some of our cognitive biases. That research is certainly fascinating, but
we should remain wary of subtle locus shifts between different levels of rationality. In some cases (e.g. superstition, gam-
bler’s fallacy), having an adapted mind is compatible with misbelief and irrationality. Even sheer stupidity.Acknowledgments
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